Creation of the CIA Essay Example for Free

Creation of the CIA Essay Despite the popular perceptions generated by Tom Clancy novels and James Bond movies, American intelligence gathering was not a Cold War invention: it has existed since the Republics founding. George Washington organized his own intelligence unit during the Revolutionary War, sending spies behind enemy lines and overseeing counterespionage operations. In 1790, just three years after the Constitutional Convention, Congress acknowledged executive prerogative to conduct intelligence operations and gave then-President Washington a secret unvouchered fund for spies, if the gentleman so pleases. [1] Intelligence has been a component of American foreign policy ever since. More important for our purposes, Americas growing involvement in world affairs during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to the establishment of several permanent intelligence organizations. In 1882, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) was created and charged with collecting technical data about foreign navy ships and weapons. Three years later, the Department of War established its own intelligence unit the Military Intelligence Division (MID). In 1908, the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened its doors. By the 1930s, the FBI had become the nations preeminent counterespionage agency and had branched into running intelligence activities in Latin America.[2] The State Department, meanwhile, had developed an expertise and a mission, which focused on overt information collection. Finally, several critical events sparked the creation of a new wartime central intelligence agency under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which collected information, analyzed raw intelligence, and carried out a range of covert, subversive operations abroad — from propaganda, to sabotage, to paramilitary operations. By the end of World War II, these five bureaucratic actors were vying for their own place in the postwar intelligence arena.[3] This was hardly the same straightforward War versus Navy Department environment that gave rise to the National Security Council system or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is frequently cited that former President Truman never thought that when he created the CIA it would ever be involved in peacetime covert operations. In 1964 Allen Dulles, one of the most influential Directors of Central Intelligence in CIA history, challenged Trumans remarks, saying that although Truman did not care for dirty Gestapo tactics, the CIA had certainly performed them during his presidency.[4] This paper will chronicle the transformation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) into the Central Intelligence Agency. It also will examine how and why the peacetime Central Intelligence Agency came to possess many of the same powers as its wartime predecessor.   In particular this paper will focus on the OSS legacy of covert operations and how the CIA inherited that legacy. The Creation of CIA During World War II, the OSS wielded broad powers, including clandestine intelligence gathering and covert political warfare. William Donovan, Director of the OSS, exhorted the United States to maintain the OSS or a close facsimile of it in the post-war period. The end of the war and the reminder of another secret organization that waged covert political warfare, the Nazi Gestapo, influenced President Truman to dissolve the OSS. However, as the United States gradually entered the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the necessity of a peacetime intelligence agency became apparent. To meet the need, Truman created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in 1946.[5] In 1947 Congress transformed the CIG into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The powers of the CIA increased dramatically as U.S. policymakers began to perceive an increasing threat of Soviet-Communists bent on world domination. By 1952 the CIA closely resembled the wartime OSS, having the same authority and capabilities. At the same time the War Crimes Trials were being conducted at Nuremberg, American intelligence officers were secretly interviewing high-ranking German officers to determine their potential usefulness in supplying intelligence on the Soviet Union. Three critical events were significant influences on the Truman Administration officials who founded and built the CIA. The first was the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which demonstrated that the United States was unprepared, not for want of information, but because no apparatus existed to filter and analyze the large volume of available information in a way that could produce accurate intelligence. This infamous intelligence failure clearly demonstrated that the security of the United States would be greatly compromised until it developed a peacetime centralized intelligence agency.[6] The second significant event was Stalins seizure of political and military control of most of Eastern Europe in violation of his wartime understanding with the Allied Powers. The fighting in Europe had only recently ended when American and foreign reports on Soviet activities in the occupied territories began to distress leaders in Washington, London, and other capitals. The third event concerned the sponsorship by Soviet and Chinese Communists of the North Korean invasion of South Korea. This sponsorship heightened Cold War tensions and strengthened the conviction of policy makers to buttress the CIAs power to fight communism. Pearl Harbor illustrated the need for a peacetime central intelligence service and the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union galvanized the Truman Administration to create a peacetime intelligence organization with quasi-wartime powers. During World War II, the United States created the first American centralized intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). On June 13, 1942, a Military Order issued by President Roosevelt created the OSS and granted it broad powers that included intelligence analysis, clandestine collection, and paramilitary, psychological and political warfare.[7] The agency operated under the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was devoted to the business of sabotage, espionage, counterespionage, and covert action, hallmarks that would be passed on to its successor, the CIA. The OSS was involved in both intelligence gathering and clandestine political warfare. To combine both of these capabilities in one agency, Donovan assigned different functions to separate branches of the OSS. Three of the main branches of the OSS were Special Operations (SO), Secret Intelligence (SI), and Counterintelligence (X-2).[8] The OSS was extremely successful in carrying out covert operations. The first important OSS covert operation was conducted in North Africa. Several assassinations, allegedly including that of Vichy French Admiral Darlan, were carried out by the Morale and Special Operation departments of the Psychological Warfare Division of the OSS. The success of the operation earned the burgeoning agency great respect and notoriety, especially in regards to covert action.  Ã‚   The CIA would soon inherit the OSSs wartime experience and assassination methods.[9]   The OSS was also remarkably successful in setting up and maintaining clandestine agents in Thailand. The OSS established a solid foundation for future CIA activities in the Southeast Asia.[10] Even early in World War II, paramilitary and political covert operations gained support of high-level figures, such as Roosevelt and Eisenhower, and began to eclipse the accomplishments of intelligence collection.  Ã‚   The OSS emphasis on covert paramilitary operations would be one of the primary legacies passed on to the CIA As historian John Ranelagh noted, The benefits of covert paramilitary action in peacetime tended to be favorably regarded on the basis of a romantic recollection of these wartime experiences of the OSS.[11]   Perhaps the most important legacy the OSS bestowed upon the CIA was that of former OSS personnel who filled the ranks of the fledgling CIA with experienced intelligence officers. Four OSS veterans, Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby, and William Casey, went on to become Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency. Throughout the war, the OSS proved to be invaluable in both intelligence collection and covert operations, clearly illustrating the advantages of combining these two capabilities in one agency. In 1944 President Franklin Roosevelt requested a secret memorandum on the subject of a postwar intelligence service from General Donovan, OSS chief. Donovan exhorted President Roosevelt to create a permanent, worldwide intelligence service after the wars end. Donovan anticipated the Cold War struggle: When our enemies are defeated the demand will be equally pressing for information that will aid us in solving the problems of peace.[12]   Donovan went on to argue that the OSS had the trained and specialized personnel needed for the task. This talent should not be dispersed.[13] Donovans proposal was foiled by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), J. Edgar Hoover, who wanted the FBI to have the exclusive right to collect and analyze intelligence on a global level. Hoover obtained a copy of Donovans proposal for a postwar intelligence service and leaked the top-secret document to the Chicago Tribune. The newspaper printed a number of inflammatory stories about Donovans plan to create a super-spy network. Congressional uproar, no doubt spurred by the bad press, caused the peacetime central intelligence agency proposal to be shelved.[14] The cautious Roosevelt was optimistic about Donovans plan, but offered no guarantees. After Roosevelts death and the close of the war, President Truman stated in a letter to Donovan that said he would liquidate those wartime activities of the Office of Strategic Services which will not be needed in time of peace.[15] Truman feared Donovans proposed centralized peacetime intelligence agency might one day be used to spy on Americans.[16] However, the reminders of Pearl Harbor and the intensifying Soviet aggressions made Truman realize that the United States could no longer deny its role as a world leader and, as such, it would require a formidable centralized intelligence agency. Even before Truman abolished the OSS, he recognized the necessity and requested proposals for the creation of an organization to collate and coordinate intelligence.[17] Upon learning of Trumans plan to disband the OSS and transfer functions to separate agencies, Donovan sent a memorandum to President Truman, on September 13, 1945, pleading that in the national interest, and in your own interest as the Chief Executive, that you will not permit this to be done.[18] President Truman, ignoring Donovans objections, issued Executive Order 9621 on September 20, 1945, titled Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions.[19] According to the Order, the State Department took over the OSS Research and Analysis Branch, while the War Department adopted the remnants of the OSS clandestine collection and counterintelligence branches, which it named the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). The capability that the wartime OSS had developed to perform subversive operations abroad was officially abandoned.[20] In December 1945 Truman deliberated proposals from both the State Department and the Joint Chiefs for a new centralized intelligence agency. Truman ultimately opted for a diluted version of the more simplistic and workable Joint Chiefs proposal.[21] The result was the creation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) on January 22, 1946. Naval Reserve Rear Admiral Sidney Souers was selected to be the first Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). President Truman invited Souers to the White House two days after creating the CIG to award him a black cloak and dagger as symbols of his new office.[22] The CIG was drastically understaffed, consisting primarily of officers borrowed from the State Department and the military services. The new agency was only a shadow of the wartime OSS. The CIG had no authorization to collect clandestine foreign information from agents in the field or to form a consensus based on information gathered from other intelligence agencies. The primary function of the agency was to coordinate the flow of intelligence to policymakers. Truman attempted to keep covert action, a prominent part of the OSS, out of this peacetime agency.[23] In reference to the directive creating the CIG, Truman stated, No police, law enforcement or internal security functions shall be exercised under this directive.[24] Compromises in the Joint Chiefs plan to appease the State Department and the Bureau of the Budget had made the CIG an interdepartmental body that lacked its own budget and personnel.[25] However, President Truman greatly appreciated the Daily Summary produced by the CIG. The Daily Summary was prepared according to Trumans own specifications, and when complete satisfied his requirements, it saved him the time of having to search through the hundreds of intelligence reports that normally flooded into the White House.[26] Rear Admiral Sidney Souers, after five months as DCI, was replaced with U.S. Army Air Forces Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg. DCI Vandenberg had an impressive military record and had the clout and ambition necessary to build the CIG into an agency that wielded great power. In just one year as Director, Vandenberg broadened the CIGs power to incorporate an independent budget and work force and won the authority to collect and analyze, as well as collate, intelligence. The CIG expanded in importance as the United States attempted to contain the Soviet Union in Europe.[27] At this point, all sides thought the intelligence battle was over. Donovan and OSS were out of the picture, the State Department had come back into the fold, and the president had created a Central Intelligence Group, which left each department to run its own intelligence affairs. As Truman and his warring military services now turned to drafting a compromise military unification bill, the intelligence consensus was clear: any legislation should include provisions codifying the presidents CIG directive. Doing so would freeze the existing intelligence system into law, insulating it from the whims or desires of future political players. On this much, at least, the War and Navy departments agreed.[28] The Central Intelligence Group did not. Ink on the CIG directive had hardly dried before the agency began taking on a life — and agenda of its own. CIGs problems were apparent from the start. During the early months of 1946, departmental intelligence services readily bypassed the central agency, sending their information and taking their case directly to the president They provided CIG with a small budget and a meager, mediocre staff. They refused to share raw intelligence and ignored the agencys efforts to reconcile or synthesize conflicting information. As Anne Karalekas writes, the intelligence units jealously guarded both their information and what they believed were their prerogatives in providing policy guidance to the President, making CIGs primary mission an exercise in futility.[29] The problem was simple: CIGs success hinged on the generosity of those who wanted it to fail. Trumans directive appeared to be working too well. Frustrated with their agencys impotence, CIG officials soon began pressing for substantial changes. In their capacity as National Intelligence Authority members, the Secretaries of War, Navy and State granted some significant concessions. But these were not enough. In July of 1946, CIG General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston sent a draft Bill for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency to the White House which sought to transform CIG from a small planning staff to a legally established, fairly sizable, operating agency.[30] This move came as an alarming surprise to the White House, which was now deeply embroiled in the unification conflict. As Troy writes, In this perspective, where the White House had the difficult problem of getting generals and admirals to agree on a fundamental reorganization of their services, the legislative problem of the CIG must have seemedan unwelcome detail.[31] As the War and Navy Departments moved towards compromise, the president and his legislative drafting team hardened toward CIG. By January, when the military finally agreed to a comprehensive unification bill, the White House was in no mood to humor CIGs demands that the legislation specifically outline CIA functions, make the Director of Central Intelligence a statutory nonvoting member of the NSC, provide procurement authorities, or grant the CIA power to coordinate foreign intelligence activities and operate centrally where appropriate. Such controversial measures threatened to reignite military opposition and reope n the entire unification conflict.[32] Thus, as CIG pressed for more, the White House responded with less. On 26 February, the President submitted his draft National Security Act to Congress. It included only the barest mention of the CIA — enough to transform the CIG directive into statutory law, and nothing more. In just 30 lines, the CIA section established the agency, placed it under the National Security Council, gave it a director appointed from civilian or military life by the president (with the Senates consent), and authorized it to inherit the functions, personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group.[33] On March 12, 1947, President Truman announced the Truman Doctrine, which was instrumental in determining the eventual shape of the CIA. Historian Harry Ransom stated, So, while Pearl Harbor may be considered the father of the CIA, the Truman Doctrine certainly was the mother; the OSS was the hero model.[34] Britain had announced that it would withdraw from Greece, allowing it to fall to the Communists. Truman decided that the United States would take on the role of a world policeman to protect all people from communist insurgency. In Trumans famous statement to Congress, he said, The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. He went on to state, I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.[35] These words would later justify the creation of a permanent intelligence agency with the powe r to wage political warfare in a time of peace. CIA provisions of the National Security Act went relatively unnoticed and unaltered in Congress. Instead, legislators concentrated on the more hotly contested aspects of merging the two military departments — issues like the power of the new Secretary of Defense and the protection of the Navys Marine Corps and aviation units. In the Senate, Armed Services Committee deliberations resulted in only two relatively minor changes to the proposed CIA, neither of which dealt with CIA functions or jurisdiction.[36] In fact, the committees final report specifically noted that the Agency would continue to perform the duties outlined in Trumans CIG directive until Congress could pass permanent legislation at a later date.[37] The CIA which arose from the National Security Act of 1947 closely resembled its CIG predecessor. Like CIG, the CIA was supposed to correlate, evaluate and disseminate intelligence from other services, but was given no specific authority to collect intelligence on its own or to engage in any covert subversive operations. Like CIG, the CIA operated under the watchful eyes of other intelligence producers; where CIG reported to a National Intelligence Authority, the CIA operated under the National Security Council — a committee including the Secretaries of War, Navy, State, Defense and the President. Mimicking the CIG directive, The National Security Act protected existing intelligence components with explicit guarantees. In deference to the FBI, the law barred the CIA from exercising any police, subpoena [sic], law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions. It also provided that the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, co rrelate, and disseminate departmental intelligence.[38] Finally, the Act borrowed two broad clauses from Trumans directive, which were to have a profound impact on the CIAs subsequent development.   The new agency was charged with conducting such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines and with performing such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.[39] Taken together, these CIA provisions created an agency, which suited War and Navy department interests to a tee. If CIG were any guide, the CIA would pose no threat to departmental intelligence agencies. Conclusions Here, too, it appears that a major national security agency was forged without much Congressional input and without much consideration of broad national concerns. Like the National Security Council system and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency took shape almost exclusively within the executive branch, where bureaucratic players cared first and foremost about their own institutional interests. The CIA was clearly a product of executive branch discussions and decisions. All three rounds of the postwar intelligence battle were fought among bureaucratic actors and were ultimately decided by the president. Round one, which pitted OSS chief Donovan against the State/Justice/Navy/War department coalition, ended with an executive order disbanding OSS and transferring its functions to the Departments of State and War. Round two featured internecine warfare between top State Department officials and the military. It, too, ended with unilateral presidential action: an executive directive which implemented the militarys recommendations for a weak Central Intelligence Group. In round three, it was CIG against the White House. With the entire unification bill hanging in the balance, and with military preferences about postwar intelligence well known, Truman and his legislative drafting team took decisive action. Rebuffing CIGs advances, they introduced a National Security Act bill which included brief, vague CIA provisions. Their aim was to continue CIG under new, statutory authority while generating as little controversy as possible.[40] Truman succeeded, thanks in large part to Congressional indifference. Legislators in both chambers accepted CIA provisions with little comment or debate. Though a few Members raised alarms about the Agencys potential police power and broad jurisdiction, these voices were whispers against the wind. Average legislators had little incentive to probe deeply into CIA design, while national security intellectuals had bigger fish to fry in the unification bill. Tellingly, even those who pressed for a more specific CIA mandate ended up simply copying from Trumans CIG directive of 1946. It seems that even here, legislators were content to defer to the executive. The QA which emerged bore an uncanny resemblance to the Central Intelligence Group. Truman himself writes that the National Security Act succeeded in renaming the Central Intelligence Group — implying the Act made no substantive changes to CIGs design or operations at all.[41] There can also be little doubt that the Central Intelligence Agency was forged out of parochial, rather than national, interests. Creating any kind of postwar central intelligence apparatus inevitably benefited some bureaucratic actors and threatened others. While OSS and CIG had much to gain by a strongly centralized system, the Departments of State, Justice, War and Navy all stood to lose. For these big four departments, promoting U.S. national security was never a paramount concern. Instead, these departments sought a central intelligence system which, above all, insulated their own intelligence services from outside interference. Paradoxically, their vision of an effective central intelligence agency was one without strong central control or coordination. The ideal CIA was a weak CIA. But why did these departments succeed? Why did the president so readily accept their vision of postwar intelligence organization? The short answer is that Harry Truman needed the military services more than they needed him. Propelled by national interest, the president had placed military consolidation at the top of his political agenda. To him, no issue was more vital to American postwar security than unifying the War and Navy Departments into a single Department of Defense, and no price was too great to achieve success. In this context, Donovans vision of a powerful statutory CIA never had a chance. From day one, War and Navy leaders strenuously opposed such a scheme. With no political capital to spare, the president went along. His executive actions and legislative recommendations all sought to create a central intelligence apparatus, which protected departmental intelligence units, rather than ensuring the new central agency would function well. Bibliography Ambrose, Stephen E. Ikes Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment. New York: Doubleday, 1981. Andrew, Christopher. For the presidents eyes only: Secret intelligence and the American presidency from Washington to Bush. New York: HarperCollins, 1995. Cline, Ray S. The CIA Under Reagan, Bush, and Casey: The Evolution of the Agency from Roosevelt to Reagan. Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1981. Caraley, Demetrios. The politics of military unification: A study of conflict and the policy process. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Dunlop, Richard. Donovan: Americas Master Spy. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982. Lowenthal, Mark. U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and anatomy. 2d ed. Westport: Praeger,   1992. Donovan, Robert. Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948. New York: Norton, 1977. Karalekas, Anne. History of the Central Intelligence Agency. In The Central Intelligence Agency: History and documents, edited by William M. Leary. University, A.L.: University of Alabama Press, 1984. Ransom, Harry Howe. The Intelligence Establishment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970. Sayle, Edward F. 1986. The historical underpinning of the U.S. intelligence community. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 1. Smith, R. Harris. OSS: The Secret History of America. First Central Intelligence Agency. Berkeley. University of California Press, 1972. Truman, Harry S. Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope. New York: Doubleday, 1956. Troy, Thomas F. Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency. Washington, D.C: Central Intelligence Agency, 1981. [1]   Andrew, Christopher. For the presidents eyes only: Secret intelligence and the American presidency from Washington to Bush. (New York: HarperCollins, 1995),   11 [2]   Sayle, Edward F. The historical underpinning of the U.S. intelligence community. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 1. 1986. [3]   Andrew [4]   Stephen E. Ambrose, Ikes Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (New York: Doubleday, 1981), 178. [5]   John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 28-30. [6]   Ibid., 33-5 [7]   Ray S. Cline, The CM Under Reagan, Bush and Casey: The Evolution of the Agency from Roosevelt to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1981), 71. [8]   Ibid. [9]   Ranelagh, 88 [10]   Ibid., 94. [11]   Ibid., 96. [12]   Quoted in R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of Americas First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 383. [13]   Ibid. [14]   Ambrose, 162-64. [15]   Truman to Donovan, 20 September 1945, United States, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 15. Here on cited as CIA Cold War Records. [16]   Richard Dunlop, Donovan: Americas Master Spy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982), 467-68. [17]   Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 73-76. [18]   William J. Donovan, Memorandum for the President, 13 September 1945, CIA Cold War Records, 3 [19]   Ranelagh, 99 [20]   Cline [21]   Sidney W. Souers, Memorandum for Commander Clifford, 27 December 1945, CIA Cold War Records, 17-19. [22]   Ambrose, 127. [23]   Cline [24]   CIA Cold War Records, 30. [25]   Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1981), 346. [26]   Ibid. [27]   Ibid. [28]   Mark Lowenthal, U.S. intelligence: Evolution and anatomy. 2d ed. (Westport: Praeger, 1992), 167-9 [29]   Anne Karalekas, History of the Central Intelligence Agency. In The Central Intelligence Agency: History and documents, edited by William M. Leary.   (University, A.L.: University of Alabama Press, 1984). 24 [30]   Elsey, George M, Papers. Harry S. Truman Library. Quoted in Demetrios Caraley, The politics of military unification: A study of conflict and the policy process (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 56. [31]   Troy, 371 [32]   Ibid, 378-9 [33]   Lowenthal, 191-5. [34]   Harry Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 83. [35]   Quoted in Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948 (New York: Norton, 1977), 284. [36]   First, the committee voted to make the president a statutory National Security Council member. Since the CIA reported to the NSC, this move theoretically gave the CIA greater presidential access than originally planned. However, it still fell far short of granting the agency a private channel to the president, especially since the president was not required to attend NSC meetings. Second, the Committee made clear that civilians, as well as military, were eligible for appointment as Director of Central Intelligence; the presidents bill did not rule out civilian appointments, but did not specifically mention them (Troy 1981: 380-90). [37]   Troy, 395 [38]   Cold War Records, 131-5. [39]   CIA Cold War Records, 177-8. [40]   Lowenthal, 176 [41]   Truman, 56-7

The Issue of Money in The Tempest and Othello :: William Shakespeare The Tempest Othello Essays

The Issue of Money in The Tempest and Othello The central issue depicted in both plays The Tempest and Othello is about money. Money in substantial amounts can represent great power and strength over the ruling nation. It plays a major role in our everyday society and one that is fully illustrated in both of Shakespeare’s play. Both of the plays are related to his matter, in that the subplot characters attempt to achieve high respect and, therefore, gain power and strength by deception. A parallelism can be drawn between the characters of Caliban, Trinculo and Stephano from The Tempest to Othello with Iago, Othello involved. Both of these scenes illustrate how the characters Caliban and Othello are easily fooled by deception. What these characters, from both plays, Trinculo and Stephano and Iago do have in common are their evil intentions and conspiracy’s to gain power by deceiving others to believe in them fully. Caliban, a half human and half beast, is easily fooled by the two men, the derivatives of a higher civilization. Trinculo and Stephano have to plans to turn every situation into their own advantage. Although, Caliban possesses much more intellect than those two roguish members labeled as â€Å"civilized†, he submits to the story that they help Caliban murder his deceitful master, Prospero. He declares that Prospero, a skillful magician has wrongfully taken over the island he had inherited from his mother Sycorax. Caliban is not at all appreciative of what Prospero gives to him because he says â€Å"You taught me language† (1,2,362) only and because he â€Å"must obey† (1,2,371) or else Prospero will inflict pain on him. Caliban immediately declares Trinculo and Stephano as his new master as he joyfully sings a song celebrating their initial meetings. Caliban is deceived into believing that Trinculo and Stephano will deliver their promises when in fact those two so called nobleman had another beneficial matter in mind. It is Stephano’s and Trinculo gift of liquor to Caliban that makes him believe that they are from a higher social class. In return Caliban has fallen from an almost intellect into the lowest social being, while Trinculo and Stephano have gained their respect, therefore they have the ability to take control over Caliban. In Othello, the same situation is drawn in that Othello and Caliban from The Tempest are both victimized because of their lack of judgement.

Death of a Salesman by Arthur Miller Essay

The play, Death of a Salesman by Arthur Miller is a tragedy. It is about an American family who live their lives masking their reality, which is filled with tension and instability, with the American dream lifestyle. The father of the household, William Loman, is the driving force behind fantasizing these illusions. Hence, in the play, we are faced with many incidences where false perceptions occur and fall apart in the face of reality. We see evidence of this unmasked false perception in the situation where many, despite his ongoing boasting of being ‘well liked’, laughed at William. Although he made it seem as if he was of major importance in his workplace, the reality was that he was indispensable. Willy was found to be an adulterer dissolving any fantasy of a stable family. Bill Oliver, Willy’s son Biffs’, past employer could not even recognize Biff, after creating the figment that he was well favoured by him. Finally, preceding his death, Willy prided himself on all the people who would show up to his funeral, however, no one but his immediate family and friends attended. At the start of the play, William comes home exhausted from his job. He confides in his wife, Linda that he no longer feels to take long trips as he usually drives from New York to Boston. To enhance his quality of life and to resolve the problem of his exhaustion, he decides that he would request jobs that require him to stay in New York. He believes that this option can be easily made available to him as he thinks he is a valuable asset to the business and that it owes a great deal to him.† I’ll come home with an advance and a New York job.† He tells Linda this with assurance, right before he goes to see his boss. On the other hand however, a different picture is painted when he goes to his boss, Howard, to make the request. He is denied his wishes. Willy even tries to negotiate lower wages with Howard in attempts to persuade him to conform to his desires but he turns his back on this plea as well. Howard goes on to further humiliate Willy as he fires him from th e job entirely. Howard tells Willy: ‘I don’t want you to represent us I’ve been meaning to tell you this for a long time.’ The wall of false adoration shatters as Howard uncovers how useless Willy really is to the running of the business. In the play, William emphasizes, in many instances, that he is ‘well-liked’ and that he is one of a kind even though this is not the case. He goes to his grave telling the tale that people from all around  love and admire him. He drills this notion so far that he believes it himself. ‘I am not a dime a dozen! I am Willy Loman and you are Biff Loman.’ He even nurtures these thoughts into the minds of his children. ‘And they know me, boys, they know me up and down New England. The finest people. And when I bring you fellas up, there’ll be open sesame for all of us, ‘cause one thing, boys: I have friends. I can park my car in any street in New England, and the cops protect it like their own.’ However, Willy’s son Biff reveals to us that in reality, people in the business world hold no respect for him and look onto him as a joke and laugh at him. ‘ They’ve laughed at dad for years and you know why? Because we don’t belong in this nuthouse of a city.’ In this situation we see where the false perception of Willy being well liked falls apart in the realistic world his son tries to live in where he can share the truth; that he is laughed at. At the core of the American dream is the ideal, stable family unit; Willy has failed in his attempts to achieve this. He has a supportive wife and thinks he has the perfect sons as he covers up their faults and does not correct their wrongs, but instead makes excuses for them. However, we see that the family is in fact unstable as he is adulterous to his wife. Despite his attempts to conceal his relations with this mistress to portray a loving father and husband, Biff finds his father in a hotel in Boston with her, when he goes to look for Willy after finding out that he has flunked Mathematics. This in turn deteriorates the once close-knit relationship that Biff and Willy had. Biff tells Linda, â€Å"he threw me out of this house remember?† Linda says, â€Å"Why did he do that I never knew why?† And Biff replies, â€Å"because I know he’s a fake and he doesn’t like anybody around who knows.† The false perception of an ideal family falls apart when Biff discovers the truth about his father. In an attempt to turn a new leaf and make something of himself, Biff decides on a plan of action. He would go to his past employer, Bill Oliver, and ask for a loan to serve as start up capital for a partnership he would start with his brother Happy, in a sports clothing company. His motive for believing he would be funded is that he recalls Bill Oliver showing favour to him and promising him anything he needed. ‘When I quit he said to me, he  put his arm on my shoulder and he said, >> Biff, if you ever need anything, come to me  him anything he needed. Biff found out that Willy was an adulterous husband eliminating any possibility of having a stable family like they would have thought in the past. Finally, only Willy’s immediate family and friends attended Willy’s funeral although he spoke of many people attending and of him being so well liked by many.

Technology is Killing Humanity - 1188 Words

Technology is Killing Humanity Today, our world is a lot quieter than it used to be. As a student and as a passenger of public transport, I now barely see people smiling, talking or making eye contact at schools and in public places. Finally, I realize why people rarely communicate with others now, and this kind of big issue is caused by a tiny thing that we all carry in our pockets every single day: smartphone. In conclusion, the excessive use of mobile Internet devices is killing humanity by destroying the meaningfulness of communication and human interaction. The eyes are the windows to the soul as the popular phrase. According to Quantified Impressions, a Texas-based communications analytics company, a normal adult makes†¦show more content†¦(Report 1) If you pay attention to the way that our teenagers text, you can find a huge difference between their own language and the normal English. Plus, a recent report by the Pew Internet American Life Project, texting ranks as the number one mode of communication among them. Kids between the ages of 12 and 17 text a median of 60 times a day -- up from 50 in 2009. (Samakow) As we can see, texting has becoming a teens daily routine. Therefore, when they get used to the way they text their friends, they will tend to apply the same thing at school. In my opinion, the only way to make people do not excessively use mobile Internet devices is to lessen or limit their opportunity to reach the Internet. Today, we have seen more and more mobile companies offer various unlimited package to the mobile users in order to let them access the Internet without any constriction. However, the mobile companies should stop promoting or offering this kind of service, and they should only provide unlimited data package to those who really have a strong need to text or to access the Internet, such as I.T. professionals or international businessman. Moreover, if someone applies an unlimited package, he or she will need to provid e some specific and significant information toShow MoreRelatedHuman Nature And Its Effects On Society1290 Words   |  6 Pagesmust respect nature. He believes that humanity should not only prioritize their needs but also consider the needs of plants and animals. Taylor believes plants and animals should be given, â€Å"legal rights,† to ensure protection of species (Taylor). Humans should not be superior to nature, and therefore must allow the safety of another species. 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